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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 09-3757 
_____________ 
 
GLENFORD G. THOMPSON,  
 
                                 Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JEFFREY A. BEARD, SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT 
OF CORRECTIONS; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE 
OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
                                   
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 06-cv-5019) 
District Judge:  Hon. Timothy J. Savage 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 10, 2011 
 
Before:   JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and GARTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  February 14, 2011) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Glenford G. Thompson was convicted in the Pennsylvania Court of Common 
Pleas of twenty-five criminal charges, many of which were drug-related.  He appeals 
from an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
approving and adopting the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of United States 
Magistrate Judge Timothy R. Rice and denying Thompson’s Petition for a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus.1   We granted a certificate of appealability because of initial concerns 
about the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s characterization of the trial record in 
proceedings on appeal and in a PCRA petition before that court.  The Pennsylvania 
Superior Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief.  However, having reviewed 
the record and the relevant opinions, we are persuaded that the decision to deny 
Thompson post-conviction relief was not “contrary to, … [or] an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 
the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); McMullin v. Tennis, 562 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 
2009).   
On appeal, we are concerned with only two of Thompson’s arguments for post-
conviction relief:  that he should not have been compelled to proceed pro se at trial and 
that he suffered from ineffective assistance of counsel due to his counsel withdrawing 
shortly before trial.   
                                          
1 Because we write only for the parties, we assume their familiarity with the facts 
of this case and do not recount them here.  We direct parties interested in those facts to 
Judge Rice’s R&R, Thompson v. Beard, 2009 WL 2568277 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2009). 
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With respect to proceeding pro se, the Supreme Court has held that a defendant 
may validly waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel so long as such waiver is 
knowing and voluntary and accompanied by the court ensuring that the defendant is 
aware of the risks of proceeding pro se.  See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).  The Supreme Court has also held more 
generally that a defendant may, through his conduct, forego his Sixth Amendment rights.  
See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (holding that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to be present at trial was not violated when he was removed from the courtroom for 
disruptive behavior); Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973) (upholding trial 
court’s decision to proceed with trial when defendant failed to return following a recess).  
The trial court’s holding that Thompson had effectively waived his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel by persisting in his dilatory and obstructionist conduct after being warned 
of the risks of proceeding pro se, and that such conduct would result in him proceeding 
pro se at trial was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court 
precedent.  Accordingly, while the Superior Court’s affirmance of that holding was 
imprecise, it does not support a grant of habeas relief.   
With respect to Thompson’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Supreme 
Court has held that, to succeed on such a claim, a defendant must show that (1) his 
counsel “made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ 
guaranteed … by the Sixth Amendment” and (2) the deficient performance “prejudiced 
the defense.”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  The Superior Court’s 
ruling that Thompson suffered no prejudice from his counsel’s withdrawal because, by 
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his conduct, he had waived counsel was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application 
of, the Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland.   Accordingly, that ruling does not 
support a grant of habeas relief.  Moreover, because Thompson was given the opportunity 
to appoint new counsel or have new counsel appointed by the court, his argument that 
counsel’s withdrawal forced him to proceed pro se is without merit.   
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court substantially for the reasons set 
forth in Judge Rice’s thorough and thoughtful R&R, which the District Court rightly 
adopted. 
